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Abstract: Cohen’s method of relevant variables applies to assessing defeasible argument strength. It explicates how 
a body of information may back a warrant and allows ranking strength of different bodies of evidence and of 
arguments. It further constitutes a way to back inductive and a priori moral warrants objectively The method also 
suggests where arguments employing these warrants may be vulnerable to bias but need not be infected by it. 
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 1. Introduction 
What is objectivity? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it is “the ability to consider or 
represent facts, information, ... without being influenced by personal feelings or opinions, 
impartiality, detachment.” What then is bias? Again according to the Oxford English Dictionary, 
in one of its meanings, it is “an inclination leaning, tendency, bent; a preponderating disposition 
or propensity; predisposition towards; predilection; prejudice, a swaying influence, impulse, or 
weight.”  Where do the questions of objectivity and bias arise for arguments? Clearly they are 
intimately connected with the issues of premise acceptability and connection adequacy. One 
would expect that acceptable premises would be represent facts or information. To the extent that 
one came to accept a premise out of some predisposition or prejudice and not on the basis of 
facts or information, the acceptability of the premises is jeopardized. To the extent that the 
warrant of one’s step from premises to conclusion reflects one’s predisposition or prejudice to 
reason according to that warrant, the adequacy of one’s reasoning at this point in the argument 
becomes questionable. The question of bias is especially acute in connection with warrants. As 
Toulmin (2003) has taught us, premises (for him data) are explicit, warrants implicit. One may 
be aware of certain evidence which has led one to accept a certain premise, especially if that 
premise asserts some description. One may also recognize that one has no evidence that in 
forming this acceptance one was influenced in some undue way. That is, one may recognize that 
one has not been confronted with defeaters in the experience on which one’s acceptance of the 
premise is based. By contrast, warrants, being implicit, might seem more prone to harbor 
predispositions towards accepting some conclusion on the basis of some premises, when the 
habit of moving from premises of the sort appearing in the argument to a conclusion of the sort 
in the argument results from some entrenched bias of which one is unaware. One may not be 
aware of the leading principle of the inferential move. A fortiori one may not be aware of the 
bias which corrupts it. 
 Although warrants may be implicit in the reasoning of an argument, they may 
nonetheless be identified. Once identified, they may be subjected to critical evaluation. Again, as 
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Toulmin (2003) has taught us, a challenger may ask not only the warrant-generating question 
“How to you get there?” but also why getting there that way “has authority and currency,” i.e., 
the challenger may ask for the backing of the warrant. The central question of this paper is 
whether warrants can be backed objectively, in a way certifiably free from bias. We shall argue 
for the objectivity of two specific types of warrant. This can be done by applying L. J. Cohen’s 
method of relevant variables. (See Cohen, 1970; 1977.) To begin, we must note several points 
for which we have argued, but where repeating the argument is beyond the scope of this paper. 
First, we may distinguish warrants backed a priori from those backed a posteriori. The paradigm 
case of warrants backed a posteriori are those which correspond to generalizations based on 
observed evidence. We may call them inductive warrants. Instances observed (better reports of 
those instances) constitute the backing for the warrant. Besides conclusive warrants expressing 
logical or semantic principles, a paradigm case for a warrant backed a priori is an instance of a 
moral principle licensing moving from premises attributing some non-moral but morally relevant 
property to a moral assertion that some duty (or some other moral or evaluative property) holds. 
For example, from the premise that John has made a promise to repay a debt by the end of the 
month, we may infer that John has a moral obligation to repay that debt within the given time. In 
this paper, we shall confine ourselves just to inductive and moral warrants. How may Cohen’s 
method of relevant variables let us show that these types of warrants may be backed objectively 
and where bias may threaten that objectivity? 
 
2. The method of relevant variables applied to inductive warrants 
 
Suppose observation reveals a constant correlation between one condition, F, and another G. The 
instances observed constitute backing for the inference rule 
 
 From:  x is F 
 To infer: x is G 
 
When is that backing sufficient so that, to use Toulmin’s (2003) words, the rule has “authority 
and currency,” i.e., one is justified in inferring Ga from the premise Fa?  The method of relevant 
variables involves a way of systematically collecting evidence to back a generalization–and its 
associated inference rule–in a way which increases the weight of support for the generalization 
or backing for the inference rule. Suppose the observed instances are flocks of chickens fed a 
diet of polished rice and subsequently developing polyneuritis and dying. Surely we have some 
justification for the inference rule 
 
 From:  x is a member of a flock of chickens fed a diet of polished rice 
 To infer: x develops polyneuritis and dies 
 
Does observance of the constant conjunction establish the authority of this rule? Is one justified 
in inferring from an instance of the premise to an instance of the conclusion? Our backing 
evidence covers a default situation. Diet—at least a diet containing no rice other than polished 
rice—is one possible causal factor for the flock’s developing polyneuritis and dying. There may 
be others. Perhaps the flock was genetically predisposed, to the point of virtual determination, to 
develop fatal polyneuritis. Suppose there is an environmental contaminant which induces fatal 
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polyneuritis, perhaps in conjunction with some other variable. A little imagination should allow 
us to develop a whole list of such contaminants. Suppose there is some other toxic ingredient in 
the particular brands of polished rice one is feeding to the chickens. Presence or absence of 
polished rice in the diet, genetic predisposition, environmental factors, ingredients other than rice 
polishings in the diet are all variables in this situation. All of them are potential causal factors. 
Let’s suppose that there are just these four. Employing the method of relevant variables, we may 
develop a series of canonical tests by cumulatively varying combinations of these variables. In 
the first test, we vary just whether polished rice is present. Our observation shows that the 
presence of polished rice is accompanied by fatal polyneuritis. But in this default situation, we 
are always working with the same type of chicken, in the same environment, with other dietary 
factors unvaried. According to the method of relevant variables, the weight of our backing 
evidence is now 1/4. Proceed to the second variable–type of chicken and thus the issue of genetic 
predisposition. Suppose we fed chickens of different types diets of polished rice and in every 
case the chickens develop polyneuritis and die, while those fed unpolished rice do not. Our 
inference rule has passed the second test and is now supported with weight 2/4. In the third 
canonical test, we vary environmental factors with respect to what our background knowledge 
indicates are possibly relevant to causing fatal polyneuritis. Suppose we find that no matter how 
we may vary the environmental factors, our generalization is confirmed and our inference rule 
remains reliable. Further, suppose we not only vary the environmental conditions but the types of 
chickens, and whether or not polished rice is present, i.e., all of the first three relevant variables. 
Our generalization is confirmed with weight 3/4 and likewise the reliability of our inference rule. 
Finally, we vary other factors in the diet besides the nutrient factors in the rice polishings. Our 
generalization remains confirmed. The weight of its support is 4/4 or 1. Cohen (1977) would call 
a generalization supported to this level a natural law. Surely the evidence collected in this 
canonical test establishes the authority and currency, i.e., the reliability of the inference rule from 
something’s being a member of a flock of chickens fed a diet of polished rice, to that chicken’s 
dying. 
 The question now arises: Suppose our canonical test confirms our inference rule only to 
level 3/4 or only 2/4 or only 1/4. Does the rule still have any authority to justify inferences?  
Recall that at level 4, we varied other factors in the nutrition besides rice polishings. Refer to this 
fourth variable as V4. Suppose three values of this variable produce counterexamples for the 
generalization we are testing, V4
1 , V4
2 , V4
3 . According to Cohen’s procedure, (1977) we may 
deal with these defeating values by modifying the inference rule. We conjoin to the antecedent 
the specification that these values do not hold, i.e., our inference rule becomes  
 
 From:  x is a member of a flock of chickens fed a diet of polished rice & 
   ~V4
1 x & ~V4
2 x & ~ V4
3 x 
 To infer: x develops polyneuritis and dies 
 
Note that this generalization passes the canonical test at level 4, i.e, at all levels of our canonical 
test. Surely this inference rule has authority and currency. One is justified in inferring an instance 
of the conclusion from an instance of the premise. 
 It should be obvious, however, that this approach risks universal generalizations and 
corresponding inference rules which are unworkably complex. If to ‘Fx” one has to add twenty-
five additional conjuncts to produce an acceptable universal generalization, then to infer that 
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“Gx” holds of some element e, one has to be in a position that not only is there a presumption 
that Fx holds of e but that all the twenty-five other conjuncts hold of e, a daunting requirement in 
most cases. But are only those inference rules which are either logically necessary or pass all 
canonical tests up through the last level capable of reliably transferring a presumption for the 
premise to the conclusion? Can one make do with an inference rule which is confirmed up to 
some level i < n? This question raises the issue of ranking or ordering the sequence of relevant 
variables. How does one decide the order of testing relevant variables in setting up a canonical 
test? Intuitively, it would seem that ordering would matter, at least in some cases. Suppose we 
have two relevant variables, Vʹ and Vʺ. Suppose, given our background knowledge, we 
recognize that the potentiality of Vʹ to include defeating values for our generalization 
 
 (∀ x)(Fx ⊃ Gx) 
 
and for its associated inference rule is distinctly greater that the potentiality of Vʺ. Should we not 
then want to test Vʹ before Vʺ? Suppose we vary the values of Vʹ but defer varying the values of 
Vʺ and we find that none of these values is defeating, i.e., the generalization passes this level of 
the test. Would not the inference rule 
 
 From:  Fx 
 To infer: Gx 
 
be stronger than if we had varied the values of Vʺ and deferred varying the values of Vʹ? Is it not 
intuitive that the more potential defeaters have been ruled out, the stronger the inference rule and 
its corresponding generalization? 
 How is one to appraise falsificatory efficiency? To answer that question, we compare two 
examples of relevant variables. Suppose polishings were restored to the diets of chickens who 
had been fed polished rice and developed polyneuritis and these chickens readily recovered. It 
looks like we have backing for the inference rule 
 
 From:  x is as flock of chickens fed polished rice, subsequently developed 
polyneuritis, then fed rice polishings 
 To infer: x recovers 
 
But the chickens observed all had the same genome. As is well known, genetic variation affects 
susceptibility to disease. Chickens with a different genome might react differently to a diet with 
polishings restored than those observed. Some genetically different chickens might not recover 
and thus provide a counterexample to the general claim that restoring polishings in the diet cures 
polyneuritis. Genetic make up is then a relevant variable to be taken into account in a canonical 
test of the inference rule or its associated generalization. Now since it is well known that genome 
affects reaction to environmental factors including diet, we might expect genome as a relevant 
variable to be addressed early in a canonical test of the generalization that a diet including rice 
polishings or unpolished rice remediates polyneuritis. 
 On the other hand, observation may also show that exposure to music of some sorts 
proves beneficial to some animals. Our chicken farmer likes Mozart. His music is frequently 
playing over the loudspeaker system where the chickens are located. So are the chickens 
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recovering from polyneuritis because rice husks have been reintroduced into their diet or because 
Mozart’s music has made them resistant? Give them rice husks but shut off the music. Suppose 
they don’t recover. Then we have a counterexample. But before taking the canonical step to this 
level, may we not ask whether it is plausible that music will have much of an effect on the 
chicken’s ability to recover quickly from polyneuritis? That genetic makeup can affect resistance 
and sensitivity to disease accords will with scientific understanding. Is there any such scientific 
understanding for music? Uniformity with previous evidence and previously established 
scientific theory is one factor in determining plausibility. That genome affects sensitivity or 
resistance to disease at least for some creatures seems a well-established scientific 
understanding. That type of music can have a similar effect is far more speculative. The genome 
theory has much more plausibility than the music theory. 
 Suppose we constructed a canonical test in which we omitted the music variable. Suppose 
also that our generalization passed all levels of the canonical test. If we now reason according to 
the rule: 
 
 From:  x is a flock of polyneuritic chickens which is now fed with 
unpolished rice and rice polishings 
 To infer: x will recover from polyneuritis 
 
and there is a presumption for the premise, will that rule transfer acceptability to the conclusion? 
We admit that this rule is defeasible, especially since the test omitted the music variable, but 
does that omission undercut the rule’s ability to transfer acceptability from the premises to the 
conclusion of an argument which is an instance of this rule? Although not including every 
variable scientifically recognized as possible, the test is sufficient to show the inference rule 
reliable to transfer plausibility from the premise to the conclusion. 
 We can also construct variants of this example. Suppose a canonical test has shown that 
some values of a relevant variable produce counterexamples to a generalization. But suppose that 
in a given application of the rule corresponding to that generalization, the plausibility of these 
defeating values occurring is quite low. Hence the burden of proof would be on the challenger to 
show that one or more of these values defeated the inference from premises to conclusion. Hence 
in this case, the inference rule transfers presumption from the premises to the conclusion. 
 We can construct variations of these cases to illustrate further our point about defeasible 
inference rules nonetheless transferring acceptability from premises to conclusion.  What then is 
the moral of this story for the adequacy of presumptive or defeasible inferences when particular 
values of one or more relevant variables in the canonical test constituting the backing prove 
defeaters to arguments instancing the rule? If there is no presumption in a particular case that 
these values hold–if the burden of proof is on the challenger to show that indeed such a value 
does hold–then the inference rule transfers the presumption from the premises to the conclusion. 
  
3. Objectivity for inductive warrants by applying the method of relevant variables 
 
Recall our characterization of objectivity from the beginning of this paper: the ability to consider 
facts or information without being influenced by feelings or opinions. It should be obvious from 
what we have just said in the last section that objectivity may characterize someone who backs 
an inductive warrant through the method of relevant variables. Should this backing be carried out 
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with consistent adherence to the method, the result will be an objectively backed warrant able to 
convey presumption objectively from the premises of an argument to its conclusion. Consider: 
The method begins, at level 0, by noting a constant correlation. But this is a matter of 
observation, of seeing what is there to see. Likewise, whether values of the ith relevant variable 
falsify or confirm the associated generalization of the warrant is a matter of observation. Again, 
identifying the relevant variables to be considered in a canonical test may be objective. Whether 
a generalization might fail under certain conditions, that these conditions constitute values of 
some variable, is a matter of information which has been previously gathered. That a variable is 
relevant is a matter of observationally supported fact. The method of relevant variables gives us a 
way of certifying that a generalization is objectively supported to a certain level, i/n. where n is 
the number of recognized relevant variables, and likewise that the corresponding warrant is 
objectively backed to that level. This backing is not a matter of subjective opinion. The only 
place for bias to enter into this process is in the selection or recognition of relevant variables. 
One might have a biased commitment to some generalization leading one to avoid subjecting it 
to test at a certain level, overlooking that relevant variable. Alternatively, the judgment that a 
relevant variable had less falsificatory potential than it actually did have could be a matter of 
scientific prejudice. The point is, however, that such introductions of bias are not intrinsic to the 
method of relevant variables but a matter of misapplying the method. At least for inductive 
warrants, the method gives us a way of objective backing. If objectively backed and the 
objectively demonstrated restrictions respected, the method indicates when the acceptability of 
the premises of an argument with an inductive warrant objectively constitute at least a prima 
facie reason for the conclusion. But inductive warrants, backed by bodies of observationally 
obtained information, are not the only type of defeasible warrant. Cohen (1970) believed that the 
method could be applied to supporting ethical generalizations among a number of types of non-
empirical generalizations. As anyone who has taught undergraduates knows, it is a matter of 
common belief that moral or ethical claims are a matter of subjective opinion, certainly not open 
to objective support. What would it mean then to apply the method of relevant variables to 
backing a moral warrant or its corresponding ethical generalization? Would the result yield 
objectively backed warrants and objectively supported ethical principles? We answer those 
questions successively in the next two sections. 
 
4. The method of relevant variables applied to moral warrants 
 
We hold that the evidence for ethical generalizations is a priori and likewise that moral warrants 
are backed a priori. We do not shy from affirming that there are synthetic a priori truths and 
regard ethical generalizations as a paradigm case. But we also regard them as defeasible. 
Consider: 
 
Jones promised to repay Smith the $5,000 he owed him in monthly installments 
beginning in January. Therefore Jones is morally obligated to make the first 
payment in January. 
 
The step from premise to conclusion in the argument seems non-controversial. But suppose 
Jones’ wife is seriously hurt in an automobile accident in December. The couple does not have 
health insurance and the medical bills will make $5,000 seem like a small sum.  Does Jones still 
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have the moral obligation to repay Smith starting in January or has the warrant been defeated? 
The answer seems obvious. The paradigm arguments we shall be concerned with are those W. D. 
Ross (1930) classed as arguments to prima facie duties (or that certain states of affairs are prima 
facie good or bad). Rawls (1971) sees the properties Ross would cite as reasons for prima facie 
duties as prima facie reasons for actual duties. Rawls’ (1971) characterization is illuminating for 
relating the evaluation of such arguments to the method of relevant variables: 
 
First principles single out relevant features of moral situations such that the 
exemplification of these features lends support to, provides a reason for making, a 
certain ethical judgment. The correct judgment depends upon all the relevant 
features as these are identified and tallied up by the complete conception of right. 
We claim to have surveyed each of these aspects of the case when we say that 
something is our duty all things considered; or else we imply that we know (or 
have reason for believing) how this broader inquiry would turn out. By contrast, 
in speaking of some requirement as a duty other things equal (a so called prima 
facie duty), we are indicating that we have so far only taken certain principles into 
account, that we are making a judgment based on only a subpart of the larger 
scheme of reasons. (p. 341) 
 
  How then may the method of relevant variables be applied to the question of when the 
premises of arguments with moral warrants transfer presumption from their premises to their 
conclusions? Consider the following argument concerning neighbors Smith and Jones: 
 
Smith destroyed the iris bed in Jones’ yard. Therefore 
 Smith acted in a morally wrong way towards Jones. 
 
Extracting the warrant from this argument is easy. (We are generalizing the argument in an 
obvious way.) 
 
 From:  x destroyed a piece of y’s property of some value 
 To infer: x acted in a morally wrong way toward y 
 
Why should one regard this warrant as reliable? Remember that we are here considering 
defeasible warrants backed a priori. Surely, we can imagine ourselves in Jones’ situation. Surely 
our sense of intrinsic value (one function of our moral sense, if you will) immediately tells us 
that this is a bad situation. Furthermore our moral intuition tells us that the wrongness of x’s act 
supervenes upon its causing this bad situation. From the perspective of the method of relevant 
variables, we are at the same level as someone who has observed a correlation between two 
phenomena. In both cases, the inference rule and its associated generalization have received 0 
level support. For the empirical correlation, no other relevant variable has been manipulated. For 
the first-order moral inference rule we have imagined no defeater in the form of an exculpating 
factor. But we could imagine such factors. Suppose Smith has just purchased an additional piece 
of property abutting both his and Jones’ back yards. 
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Suppose Smith’s easiest access to his new piece of property is across Jones’ property. Suppose 
Smith fairly compensates Jones for the access route and proceeds to construct it. Building this 
access route has destroyed something of value on Jones’ property, but in this instance has Smith 
acted in a morally wrong way toward Jones? Given the additional facts, clearly he has not. 
Smith’s fairly compensating Jones for value destroyed is a relevant variable. Imagining ourselves 
in Jones’ place in this situation is like testing whether an empirical generalization withstands 
manipulating a relevant variable. Our generalization does not pass the test. But we could 
straightforwardly construct an inference rule and associated generalization which do. Add as a 
conjunct to the antecedent of the generalization the condition that x did not compensate y fairly 
for the value destroyed. Suppose Smith simply built a driveway across Jones’ property without 
paying or even offering to pay Jones any compensation. Clearly Smith has acted in a morally 
wrong way towards Jones. As in the empirical case we can order the relevant variables according 
to their potential for generating a counterexample to a universal generalization or a defeater to 
the corresponding inference rule, so we may also at least enumerate relevant variables in the 
moral case. Paying some sum in compensation is a relevant variable. Paying fair value is one 
variant. Paying trivial token compensation is another value, one the generalization may easily 
survive. 
 So when do these moral warrants transfer acceptability from premises to conclusion? The 
case is parallel to the empirical case. We have indicated that we may enumerate moral variables. 
So we may construct the levels of a canonical test, each level i ≥ 1 consisting of the conjunction 
of values of the relevant variables up through level i. If our inference rule is never defeated, that 
our premise is acceptable gives us a conclusive reason to assert that the conclusion is acceptable 
also. By contrast, if a counterexample emerges at some level and there is a presumption that the 
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conjunction of values constituting the counterexample does not hold in the case described in the 
premise, i.e., the conjunction of the premise and the assertion that this counterexampling 
combination of variables does not hold, again we have acceptability transfer. If there is no 
presumption either way or where the burden of proof is on the challenger to show that this 
combination of values holds, acceptability transfer still holds until or unless the challenger 
successfully presents a defeater. Only if there is a presumption that the defeating combination of 
values does hold is acceptability transfer defeated. 
 The reader may have two objections at this point. First, we have gone from imaginatively 
considering a single case of property destruction to a general principle. Is this hasty? Following 
Cohen, (1977) we may argue that it is not. The argument is simplicity itself. Treat like cases like. 
Smith has destroyed the iris bed in Jones’ yard. Our premise consists of this one morally relevant 
fact. No values of any exonerating relevant variables have been mentioned. So when we have a 
case of one person destroying something of value which belongs to someone else, and this is the 
one morally relevant fact presented, we may assent to the conclusion that the person acted in a 
morally wrong way, admitting that our case is defeasible. Empathetically entering into the case 
allows us to intuit a general connection. The second objection goes to the heart of our enterprise 
in this paper. 
 
5. Objectivity versus bias in moral warrants 
 
May we accord moral sense the same epistemic status as empirical observation? In the empirical 
case, we tell whether or not some value of a relevant variable or combination or values of 
relevant variables constitute a counterexample to a generalization by empirical observation. The 
antecedent of our generalization holds but not the consequent. But what serves the analogous 
role in the moral situation? We “see,” i.e., empathetically appreciate, the wrongness of 
destroying an iris bed belonging to someone else. We “see” that the wrongness is defeated–at 
least in some cases of destroying value–by paying just compensation. But this seeing is a matter 
of moral sense. Our moral sense may indicate that some state of affairs, such as the destruction 
of an object of aesthetic value, is intrinsically bad. But when the object destroyed belongs to 
someone other than the one who destroyed the object, our moral sense may disclose that the act 
was wrong. Furthermore our moral intuition lets us “see” that the badness of the state of affairs  
supervenes on its being an instance of the destruction of some object of value and the wrongness 
of the act supervenes on its being a instance of harming someone else. These are basic beliefs, 
just as beliefs generated by observation of the external world are basic. But there is a 
presumption for such empirical beliefs unless one is aware of some defeater such as a perceptual 
malfunction or an environmental anomaly. Why then should there not also be a presumption for 
moral sense and moral intuition? Why should we not accord them the status of innocent until 
proven guilty–reliable unless defeated–as we would to sense perception?  
 But today’s rampant relativism (especially among college students) would claim that 
moral sense and moral intuition are subjective. But are they? Is it simply an opinion that 
destroying something of beauty is a bad state of affairs and since what is destroyed is on 
someone else’s property, the act of destruction without reparation has morally wronged the 
person who owned the object of beauty? Suppose someone says he thinks such a state of affairs 
is quite fine and the action quite permissible. May we show through argument that the burden of 
proof lies with him to justify such evaluations? 
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 The issue of moral relativism and its critical appraisal is beyond the scope of this paper. 
But argumentation theory can offer something in response to our question and may let us 
strengthen our case that the burden of proof is on the objector to justify rejecting the reliability of 
moral sense and moral intuition. In the case of singular statements, in the simplest case 
statements predicating a property of some subject, there may be a presumption for a statement 
given the source which vouches for it. Moral sense and moral intuition are sources and there 
may, in some cases, be agreement among these and other sources. Now, as Rescher (1976) points 
out, if several sources vouch for a statement, we can regard them as one source, with probity 
enhanced over that of any of its individual members. Again, as Rescher (1976) points out, 
Aristotle in the Topics gave special importance to three sources: “all or the majority or the 
experts or the best and most reputable of among them” (p. 6, fn. 3). So we have precedent for 
granting a presumption for what is vouched for by these sources, where convergent judgments 
were generated by moral sense and moral intuition. Now would we expect the majority to agree 
that the destruction of objects of value, ceteris paribus, is a bad thing? Would those versed in 
aesthetic criticism (construing aesthetics broadly) say it is a bad thing, especially experts who 
could claim some special competence in appraisal? Would we expect that a majority of these 
persons would simply shrug their shoulders when asked whether the destruction of an object of 
aesthetic value belonging to someone other than the destroyer was wrong and simply say it was 
just a matter of subjective taste? So the argumentation theorist has a response to the relativist 
here. Given the source which vouches for that response, the burden of proof is on the relativist to 
show that there is a presumption for the claim that judging the destruction of something of value 
to be a bad thing and, if the object destroyed someone else’s property, morally wrong is simply a 
matter of subjective opinion. 
 We may argue that the burden of proof for the relativist is even higher, even much higher. 
The claim that someone who has destroyed something of value which belongs to someone else 
has acted in a morally wrong way toward that person is a first-order moral generalization. But as 
Cohen (1970) points out, such moral generalizations may be organized into moral theories (p. 
174). For example, a theory may indicate that one moral generalization takes precedence over 
another, as when the duty of paying for goods or services received is said to be more stringent 
that the duty of benevolence. A duty of reparation may very well have higher stringency than 
other duties. At a higher level yet may be what their advocates regard as moral first principles, 
such as Mill’s principle of utilitarianism. Can the relativist simply say that all these moral claims. 
no matter what the level and no matter who or how many may vouch for them, are all matters of 
opinion, where one’s opinion is as good as another’s? Clearly that is a high burden of proof. 
 So how may one discern objectivity from bias in the case of moral warrants? Focusing 
just on warrants that license inferences from non-evaluative but evaluatively relevant properties 
to evaluative properties, without doubt, bias may enter here. One may be predisposed to accept a 
certain warrant or reason according to it. But as our argument has attempted to show, such bias 
need not be universal. Moral warrants may be vouched for, including both first-order warrants 
linking nonmoral but morally relevant properties with moral properties, and also higher level 
generalizations. The question now is whether we can link the fact that moral warrants can be 
vouched for with the method of canonical tests and increasing strength of support through the 
method of relevant variables. Can we argue that moral warrants can be supported by increasingly 
complex tests which are analogous to the canonical tests supporting empirical hypotheses? 
Cohen (1970) has suggested a way to proceed (pp. 172-74). Consider the warrant 
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 From  x enslaves y 
 To infer: x acts in a morally wrong way towards y 
 
Let us enter empathetically into the condition of a slave, where we imagine nothing further than 
that the person has been enslaved, in contrast to the person’s being a slave of a certain gender, 
nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or a slave endowed with certain talents or other gifts. 
That is, in accordance with the OED definition of objectivity, we are not allowing our feelings 
about any of these other conditions to influence our judgment of the case. Can there be any doubt 
that in the vast majority of cases, persons would judge that the enslaved person is being morally 
wronged by the person who is enslaving him? Should our expectation be correct, would not this  
consensus on the issue be evidence for the objectivity of our judgment? We may argue that this 
situation is analogous to the 0th level of an empirical canonical test. We have noted a correlation 
and have framed a hypothesis, 
 
Since the enslaving person has enslaved the victim, he has acted in a morally 
wrong way toward that victim. 
 
We have not imagined that any other potentially relevant variable has also been operating here 
which might affect the judgment that the enslaved person has been wronged. It is wrong to 
enslave this person qua person. But will there also be consensus that like cases should be treated 
like? If so, then the principle of universalizability is also objective. Hence our judgment is not 
that some particular hypothetical slave has been wronged by being enslaved, but that enslaving 
any person is wrong. So 
 
For any x and y if x enslaves y, x acts in a morally wrong way towards y 
 
is an objective moral principle with 0 level inductive support. But we have abstracted from any 
other condition than that the person had been enslaved. But now, as with an empirical canonical 
test, we may consider these other factors, alone or in combination. Can we also expect moral 
consensus when the enslaved person is a woman, a homosexual, a migrant or refugee? Indeed, 
can we find any variable which is relevant constituting a counterexample to our universal 
judgment that one who enslaves has morally wronged the one who is enslaved? As factors are 
eliminated, the weight of support for our generalization increases, parallel to the increase in 
support for an empirical generalization as a canonical test which proceeds through empirical 
relevant variables finding them not yielding counterexamples. As an empirical generalization 
which is supported to level n/n achieves the status of a natural law, so a moral generalization 
supported to this level constitutes a moral law. Analogously to the empirical case, should there 
be a consensus that some condition justifiably permits enslaving a person, we could modify our 
principle to exclude such cases, making the modified principle immune to counterexampling at 
that level. We submit then that we can distinguish objectivity from bias in the case of moral 
warrants. If there is a consensus that treating someone qua a person is morally permissible, 
required, right, wrong, and a consensus for treating like cases like, and that the more potential 
exceptions ruled out, the more objectively stronger the principle, then there are objectively 
justifiable and objectively justified moral warrants. Surely if a moral generalization has achieved 
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a high level of support from such a canonical procedure and one dissents from the generalization 
without citing a potential relevant variable which has not yet been tested, the burden of proof 
would be on the dissenter to justify his or her dissent. Absent such justification, would we not 
have a prima facie case that the dissenter is biased? 
 
6. Objectivity, bias, and the practice of argumentation 
 
If the considerations in the paper are cogent, we have shown for two types of defeasible 
arguments at least that we may give objective justification for the warrants of arguments of that 
type. That is, the question of whether the warrant adequately connects the premises of an 
argument to its conclusion so that the acceptability of the premises is transferred to the 
conclusion and the strength or weight of that connection can be assessed through a method, that 
of relevant variables, which makes this assessment on the grounds of evidence. This evidence is 
objective in a sense that is within the bounds of meaning of “objectivity.” Likewise the method 
of relevant variables gives us a way of challenging a step in an argument as being biased and 
gives us a way of showing just why it is biased. First identify the warrant, answer Toulmin’s 
(1958/2003) warrant-generating question “How do you get there?” and then address his backing 
generating question, “Why does your warrant have authority and currency?” The authority and 
currency of the warrant is determined by the extent of the canonical tests it has passed. For a 
proponent to reason according to a warrant that is not properly supported is to open himself to 
the charge of bias, especially if one could show that personal feelings or attachments led the 
proponent to reason in that way. 
 Our discussion has covered two types of defeasible warrants. There are more we can 
easily identify. One comes to identify the warrants of legal arguments a posteriori through 
knowledge of the laws that have been enacted by properly authorized legislative bodies together 
with precedents established by judicial decisions. But legal warrants backed by legal provisions 
are defeasible. The law is an institution and so legal warrants are instances of institutional 
warrants and one can argue paradigm instances. They are also open to justification through the 
method of relevant variables as Cohen (1970, pp. 155-171) shows. There are many further 
institutions, games with defining rules for example, which supply us with defeasible a posteriori 
warrants. What then may we say of objectivity and bias in institutional arguments? One may 
argue that there are other classes of arguments with warrants known synthetic a priori, in 
particular those arguments by analogy which Govier (1999; 2010) has identified as a priori. 
Hence, there is much more we can say about distinguishing objectivity from bias in 
argumentation through the method of relevant variables. Sufficient to the purposes of this paper 
if we have shown the method to let us distinguish objectivity from bias in inductive and at least 
one kind of moral argument. 
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